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Editorial

THE beginning that has been made with revising Coverdale's version of the Psalter[1] promises well for the whole. By its terms of reference the responsible Commission was restricted to removing obscurities and errors in translation while retaining, so far as possible, the style and rhythm of Coverdale's version and its suitability for congregational use. It is, however, disconcerting that at the only place where actual disagreement among members of the Commission is recorded the minority, and not the majority, was right. This is in Psalm 23. 4, where "the valley of the shadow of death" is retained, although "the Commission agreed that the most probable rendering of this phrase is 'the darkest valley', and a minority felt that this translation should be incorporated in the text". We hope that it will be, on the grounds both of faithfulness to the original and of gain in width and appropriateness of reference.

The Commission was not appointed to consider the use that is made of the Psalter in the services of the Church. Many will sympathize with what Prof. C. F. D. Moule said in a letter to *The Times* newspaper (24 April 1961): "As the years pass, I am violently and increasingly impatient with the indiscriminate use of the whole Psalter *as a vehicle of public worship and as an expression of Christian praise and prayer.*"[2]

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The Bishop of Sheffield packed a remarkable amount of wisdom into his 1960 Visitation Charge. Together with it he has published a summary of the answers which he received to a questionary that he sent beforehand to all parishes in the diocese. While these naturally relate to local conditions, the Bishop's Charge is applicable to the work of the Church in industrial areas generally. He wrote it in France, and so perhaps was able to view the English situation with a certain healthy detachment, but he has always had a gift for terse, shrewd, tonic comment. *A Mission of the People of God*[3] would make salutary holiday reading for parish priests and church councillors.

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Autres temps autres mœurs.—"Can we not all call to mind with sore and unpleasant reminiscences our intercourse with some confi-

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[1] *The Revised Psalter.* The First Report of the Commission to revise the Psalter appointed by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York. Book I: Psalms 1–41. S.P.C.K. 1961. 3s. 6d.

[2] Italics his. See also his article, "Understandest thou what thou singest?" in THEOLOGY, October 1958, pp. 405–8.

[3] L. S. Hunter, *A Mission of the People of God.* S.P.C.K. 1961. 7s. 6d.

dential adviser of our Bishop, perhaps a young man not many years in Holy Orders, perhaps a stranger to the diocese, nearly certain to be a stranger to Greek, but young, or imported, or inferior in mental calibre though he be, still the only bridge whereby we may cross over the chasm between ourselves and our Father-in-God? Why do you suppose it is, my Lord, that the very thought of these smooth, pale, young men causes us a bilious shudder, and makes us nearly ready to turn dissenters? It is simply because they have no legal status, or recognized responsibility. We say instinctively, 'Who made thee a ruler and a judge over us?'"—John Ingle, *A Letter to the Right Honourable the Lord Stanley, M.P., on the Dean of Carlisle's Recent Scheme of Cathedral Reform (So Called)* (1864), p. 10.

The Justification of the Church's Engagement in Social Work, its Dimension and Mode of Operation

FUNDAMENTALLY the justification of the Church's engagement in social work springs from the compassion of our Lord, exemplified in deed and word. The mission of Christ's Body, the Church, can never be reduced to a spoken word, even a word of saving revelation. The whole of the Scriptures affirms this. The New Testament is explicit that the "diakonia" is inseparable from "kerugma", and all the centuries of Church history give evidence of the support of the Christian faith to this fact. That evidence is both positive in the inestimable contribution the Church has made down the centuries through personal and institutional care for people, and negatively, by the proper condemnation into which she has fallen when she has neglected the care of persons in society and retreated into a preoccupation with her own existence and with "religion". "Take care of him" is the clearest word of Christ to his Church, and there will never be a time when there will not be a duty of the individual Christian and of the group of Christians in their locality to "take care" of people.

But the Church has always seen that, unless driven into a ghetto by a hostile State, her social responsibility was not to be exhausted in the care of person for person. She has also expressed that care through institutional and organizational means, and not only in the service of her own membership but also of society in general. In our own country the history of the institutions of social care bears evidence of this fact for, in days in which society at large and the State made minimum provision if any and when care was largely left to voluntary groups, the Church was the major agency of institutional provision for social care, for education, for the poor and aged, the sick and damaged, and so on.

But this is to speak of past days. Progressively and at accelerating rate since the last war, society itself, through the social services of a welfare state, has set up a complex structure to serve personal and

social needs, with the result that many services, once rendered by the Church in a more simple form of society, are now undertaken by statutory services, and much of the personal service that would once have been rendered within and through the social institutions of the Church is now rendered within the growing army of social workers, of all kinds, employed in the statutory agencies of the State.

The question immediately follows—What is the policy of the Church in the light of these structural changes in the life of society? This question can be looked at in a purely pragmatic way and at one level must be looked at in this way, for it is a simple fact that a "dual system" of statutory and voluntary social work has emerged in many fields. And we should note this is not uncongenial to British opinion. But, nonetheless, the Church is left with institutional work and social services that can increasingly be met by the State services, at the same time as new statutory organizations develop to meet new needs in new ways, which will have no counterpart in the provisions of the Church. This practical aspect of the question has to be met by practical decisions and new thinking. As a prelude to these decisions there needs to be a theological understanding by the Church about the mode whereby she fulfils her social responsibility in the light of the growing provisions of society itself. There is little precedent of thinking or practice to help us. The whole question is raised by the relationship of the Church as an institution ministering to men in Christ's name and society ministering to a wide variety of needs by the demand of an enlightened popular thinking. We wish to consider this question theologically.

Once we grant that the Church's responsibility for social care stems from her very title deeds, several theories present themselves for consideration, which we briefly consider:

(1) Conceivably it may be argued that since the State now accepts wide positive responsibility the Church is wholly relieved of any obligation. Some might even say that thus the Church is left with her own most proper responsibility, which is a religious one. We submit that this is a grossly unwarranted view for several reasons. On the one hand, it presupposes the complete adequacy of the social services to meet every conceivable human need and at every depth—a perfectionist and even pretentious view that the social services would themselves surely disavow—and on the other hand, it assumes that the Church's concern can be restricted to a so-called "religious" one, indifferent to the complex character of the human personality or the web of relationships into which it is woven. It suggests that human needs can somehow be sharply divided between "religious" and "material", a view that we think would be rejected both by the best Christian thinking and the best thinking of the social agencies of the State. The widespread reference in our society to what are called "spiritual needs"—which are by no means restricted to a narrowly religious interpretation evidences the rejection of this dichotomy.

(2) Conceivably the Church could aim at parallel provision of services to those of the State, at a rigid extension of a "dual system". This of course is quite unrealistic when the complexity, specialism

and cost of such services are considered. But quite apart from this, theologically such a theocratic concept of the Church is false. It presupposes that the Church is a "State within a State"—a view that is foreign to the Protestant concept of the "great" Church, and wholly alien to the traditions of our country.

(3) It would be possible for the Church to forswear the errors of these two extremes by a compromise, erected into a theory that her role in the field of social work is to fill gaps. This view, of course, has its own realism in that the Church has not only pioneered social work, which is to fill gaps indeed, but in the ethos of British social tradition she has been left to carry on pieces of work that later statutory services have recognized, used, built around and incorporated. (The case of the unmarried mother and baby is a clear case in point.) There is realism in this view too, in that there will always be "gaps" where a voluntary society can act with speed and can experiment ahead of public opinion. (The Family Service Unit, Marriage Guidance Council and work with coloured immigrants, etc., are illustrations of this.) But as an adequate expression of the Church's responsibility for social work this "gap" theory is defective. In practice it tends to leave her with a total responsibility for too limited and restricted pieces of work, often a survival from an earlier age, and at the same time to exclude her influence from wider fields of social work that have been developed by statutory agencies in relation to new situations. The danger in this is that the illusion is fostered that the Church is relevant to the social work field while in fact she is blind to the new areas in which she has a proper responsibility. The "gaps" theory is, in fact, a rationalization of an inherited situation—it is really an abandonment of any comprehensive policy. It may stimulate us to look for gaps to fill, and this is important, but it ignores any possible responsibility in relation to the massive provisions already in existence and may lead to our holding on to dwindling pieces of work some of which may be more effectively done by statutory agencies and might well be so done if we did not "fill the gap".

(4) We could counter the errors in the above theories by emphasizing that many Christian men and women exercise a truly Christian vocation through their professional service in the statutory agencies, and that this is the proper mode of the Church's participation and influence in social work. That is to say that her task is adequately fulfilled by Christians at work in the social machinery of the State. It is a view, moreover, that is strengthened when we admit, as the Church must surely admit, with gratitude, that the concept of the social welfare, certainly as it is conceived in the British scene, is so largely consonant with the Christian conscience and that so many men and women have entered into the statutory social services with a strong sense of Christian calling. There is in this theory a deep truth which needs to be emphasized, for the Church is not to be understood in a purely institutional way. She *is* at work through the laity dispersed into their secular callings. But we believe it is no disrespect to the State agencies or to the laity serving within them

to say that the Church could too easily absolve herself of responsibility by reliance on this undoubted truth.

We reiterate, that the Church *is* at work through her laity, and that this mode of Christian influence upon and within society should be regarded as normative in a Christian society. This is the norm in the liberal and "open" society, and we submit for our own, whose best moral and social assumptions can be supported by Christian sanctions. Such an understanding of the mode of the Christian influence is a bulwark against clericalism and ecclesiasticism, but *just because this is theoretically the normative mode and assuming that its operation is important from the Church's point of view, we submit that it calls for some support from the Church by a planned policy, demanding deep understanding of the social problems of modern society, theological appraisal and critique of the social services, as well as machinery, to ensure easy encounter, communication and dialogue with the statutory services themselves. This could only be fostered by competent personnel representing the Church who could establish informal and close relationships with the whole range of statutory agencies and the personnel serving them.*

We think this follows logically from the theological conviction that the Church is called to inform society and colour it through the dispersion of Christian laity into their normal jobs in the life of the world, but it needs strengthening by some organizational means and cannot be left as a casual by-product of the existence of the Church in society.

This raises, however, a major theological question of interest, we suspect, to all social workers whether they would call themselves "Christian" or not. Implicit in our assumptions is the belief that there is a distinctive Christian and theological approach to social work. Is this, in fact, a valid assumption? And if it is theologically valid for Christians, can that validity be intelligible or acceptable to those who do not share explicit Christian beliefs? What, in fact, are we saying and implying by such an assumption? Indeed, what estimate of social work lacking such assumption are we making?

We have already inferred, and it would command general agreement, that there are different depths of human need—not that deeper needs are necessarily more urgent and important than the less deep—but there are different depths. For example, the care of a broken leg or the administration of supplementary National Assistance to the blind, are less imponderable, complicated and subtle than, let us say, the rehabilitation and re-establishment in society of the discharged prisoner or the problems presented to the unmarried mother. We may assert theologically that where a service is rendered with care and understanding at any level it finds its full sanction in the Christian faith, which, without qualification, commands us to care for those who need. But we submit that the deeper the level of need, the more "spiritual" the need (a phrase by no means confined to practising Christians), the more the Christian view of man, his nature, purpose and meaning throw light on the problem. In this

sense there is a distinctive Christian insight, not necessarily contradictory to the best secular insights, sometimes confirming them, but always throwing light on them. We submit, too, that if there is so frequently in our society a congruence between the best "secular" and the explicitly Christian insight, it is not wholly unrelated to the extent that the Christian assumptions have penetrated the whole field of social work in this country. We are saying that every truly good service finds its unqualified support in Christian revelation, but that the significance of the service is deepened by Christian revelation, and that the more spiritual needs of men and women are illuminated by it.

It is for this reason that the Church—chiefly through Christians in the social services—has the duty to scrutinize the assumptions, operations and needs of the statutory services and their own not excluded. It goes without saying that there are qualities important in social work—not the monopoly of Christians, but surely expected of them—that find their most potent commendation in Christianity—such qualities as unsentimental realism, sympathy and understanding, respect for persons, patience, and faith, hope and charity.

From these theological considerations of the justification, dimension and operation of the Church's concern for social work, it is possible to determine some practical strategy that might follow logically. The theological considerations suggest that the development of the Church's contribution should include the following:

(1) The Church needs instruments, organization and personnel that will stimulate and educate the mind of the Church on the Christian concern for social work and social service, to include personal service, statutory and voluntary organized services, and such organized provisions as the Church herself ought to make. The Church needs to understand the close relationship between her own gospel and all ministration to persons, irrespective of the aegis under which it is rendered.

(2) The Church needs her own trained personnel in the field of social work to serve the Church in the above capacity, but also to establish the closest informal relationships with the whole range of statutory and voluntary social agencies and the personnel employed within them. There is precedent for this, but it needs to be strengthened and extended as a matter of policy. It would serve many practical considerations, enabling the Church's pastoral work to relate to the social agencies more skilfully, but not less important it is dictated (from the Church's own point of view) by the "spiritual needs" at their different levels—that must be recognized in all work with persons. The secret of good liaison will be in the professional respect that the social workers in the service of the Church and the statutory services can have for one another, their confidence in one another, the informality of their association, and the quality of their thinking and dialogue. In the last resort we believe that this is the most valuable contribution of the Church as an institution into the field of social work.

(3) In a continually changing society there will always be new social and personal needs to be met, gaps to be filled, pioneering and experimentation to be undertaken. We have noted that the Church has always made a substantial contribution in this way, although it has sometimes been amateurish, with inadequate resources, unplanned by the Church as such, and sometimes maintained after the need has changed or a statutory agency had provided for it. But there always will be needs to be met by the Church's own initiative. Such initiatives may leave the Church wholly responsible for the promotion of a piece of work. They may lead to the formation of corporate groups who accept responsibility for such work. They should always entail the closest co-operation with the statutory and voluntary agencies that bear on the problem under consideration. The rough criteria for the appropriateness for the Church's undertaking such work might include the following:

(*a*) Pioneering where the general public does not recognize the need or where the need is not adequately met by other services (e.g. much family counselling and marriage guidance, provision of home and base for discharged prisoners, hostels for homeless women and girls, problem families, etc.).

(*b*) Where flexible, highly experimental and novel projects seem required, where there are no precedents, or where the problem is outside the reach of existing services (e.g. new forms of youth service, community work with foreign immigrants, etc.).

(*c*) Where the social need to be met requires numbers of voluntary workers to render simple, continuous service in a locality (e.g. friendship services, visitation and care at home of the aged, blind, crippled, defective, lonely, etc.).

(*d*) Where the element of spiritual and moral care is primary and a re-orientation of the mind is an essential part of meeting the need (e.g. work with alcoholics, the suicide prone, homosexuals and prostitutes, unmarried mothers, shelter care, etc.).

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Religion and Road Safety — II

The comments of psychologists on the implications of so common a pursuit as driving a car are, as in other spheres, apt to seem unduly sweeping and oversubtle about an everyday affair; but we should certainly not underestimate the operation of defence mechanisms whenever unconscious motivations of the kind we are considering are explored, and the picture they draw is not unrecognizable, by any means. It begins with the Eden situation and the temptation to be as gods. There is, to vary the mythology, a potential Prometheus or Icarus in every man. The motor-car puts at human disposal a phenomenal increase of personal power in response to extremely small effort. Slight movement of one foot can transform every little Charlie into an astronaut. His will to power, fundamental sin of

Lucifer himself, is unleashed and multiplied beyond his ready recognition of the situation, satisfying one of his deepest urges. The instrument of it is also, until it gets out of control, astonishingly docile. Its obedience is so immediate that he readily identifies himself with this extension of his personal prowess—indeed, to be a first-class driver, say the experts, he needs to become completely at one with his machine; to have such sympathy with it that he "feels" its performance through his body. It thus becomes his *own* power and will which are so vastly multiplied and projected. Both time and space alter their characteristics to suit his whim. And who are these lesser beings who presume to impede his god-like capacity? Is that recalcitrant pedestrian on the crossing mocking him by his leisurely progress? How dare that under-powered carriage in front remain in his path when seemliness demands it should obliterate itself at his approach? The greater the unexamined exaltation, the greater the corresponding irritation at its obstruction.

An unconscious sexual element is also pointed out in this identification. High-speed automobilism, according to Dr Kinsey, is an unsuspected substitute for masturbation. The vast virility of the machine is seemingly transferred to its master. Advertising experts admit deliberately exploiting the repressions and neuroses of 20th-century man by presenting the motor-car, according to design and the age-group aimed at, as either a mistress equivalent or a substitute mother figure. Thus the potency of the libidinous multiplies hugely as he inserts himself into the close embrace of his sleek and elegant and beautifully groomed sports car; moreover, "she" leaps to submit to his will. "One day she wouldn't start for me," a man in his mid-thirties remarked of his former treasure, "and I simply couldn't forgive her; so I hardened my heart and sent her away"—as if he were Ahasuerus dismissing Vashti. Fantastic as such dissection may seem at first, it doubtless explains the lavish advertisements which go especially with motor-shows, in which highly personable young ladies in the latest fashion of gowns or bathing attire drape themselves about the coruscating fast cars whose desirability they are intended to personify. Parallel to this, with the ambivalence common to such disguised mental functioning, is the playing upon the maternal aspects of the ampler and more indulgent transporter in whose warm and cushioned and silently protective interior one may be carried softly as in the sheltered anonymity of the womb. It is scarcely possible to mother some people too much in this way, and such cars are frequently endowed with projected personality. The anonymity of this intra-uterine aspect further promotes the regression to the childish and the primitive which characterizes bad driving. Within his motor-car a man may withdraw from the body of society. He can become a nameless, mysterious creature for whom those without have ceased to be persons, equally lost in identification with their machines and thus far no longer human; not remotely members one of another, at all.

Women are less apt to exalt and personalize the machine or to identify themselves with it, and are less stimulated by it than men

to aggressive competition. But, being more detached, they are more distractable, more likely to carry on animated conversations, while driving, and respond more emotionally and less automatically to conditions of sudden danger—even, say, a stray cat on the road, which the average man would leave with relative indifference to look after itself. Lack of mechanical interest, too, usually limits skill.

Even were these analyses only partially true it becomes clearer why repeated exhortations to motorists to be good have limited efficacy in preventing accidents. From the Christian point of view we are dealing with a problem of unredeemed human nature, a region in which we need to recognize the danger of finding ourselves with limited power of ourselves to help ourselves, as the collect reminds us. It would seem the usual approaches to the question are altogether too facile in appealing mainly to conscious effort after decent behaviour. A theological consideration of it would not expect fallen human nature, subjected to the peculiar artificial stresses we have been considering, to elevate itself by tugging at its own shoelaces. It is often, in short, an idolatrous situation, in which by means of false gods of our own manufacture we indulge in self-aggrandisement inimical to our due honouring of God and our proper regard for our neighbour. Naive as it would sound to a typical motor-car salesman, the problem is fundamentally religious, and the Christian approach surely requires that having done individually all we can on the conscious and practical level to take this matter seriously, we must be also watchful and prayerful about it. Insight into psychological motivations, especially as they concern ourselves personally, is of tremendous initial value, and here, in confronting ourselves as we are, intelligence and ethical standards can have decisive effect. If we are not unaware of insidious influence upon us it can be recognized for what it is before it runs wild, and be checked or put in its place. It is also possible to make appropriate allowances for others. That is one object of this inquiry. R. L. Stevenson's counsel (in *The Dynamiter*) is apposite: "These are my politics: to change what we can; to better what we can; but still to bear in mind that man is but a devil weakly fettered by some generous beliefs and impositions; and for no word however sounding, and no cause however just and pious, to relax the stricture of these bonds." Further than this, however, the victorious Christ descends into the underworld of the Unconscious to harrow its demonic elements on our behalf.

What practical bettering is open to us in this matter? Referring again to Lord Justice Devlin's classification, a great deal can be done about errancy, and it is our responsibility as Christians to discipline ourselves clear-sightedly to do it. For us every single human being, however prodigal, is most precious in God's sight and redeemed at infinite cost to himself by our Lord, and we have no right at all to endanger our fellows by casual ineptitude. Nor may we acquiesce lightly in our own selfishness, conceit and personal convenience. "One aspect of convenience," says the Report of the British Council of Churches, already mentioned, "is the luxury of not bothering to think about the problem in case it demands sacrifices". First, then,

we ought to consider seeking some recognized appraisal of our driving habits. An attempt at the test of the Institute of Advanced Drivers would prove a salutary revelation to many people concerning their performance. ("A group from which we frequently turn many down flat", said the examiner, "is instructors from driving schools. . . .") The Institute now has test centres all over the country. To the many who might view that two-hour police test as too exacting, may be recommended the rather more flexible tests of the League of Safe Drivers, which is now expanding and has the co-operation of the Ministry of Transport (information can be obtained from the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents). Its first-class standard aims to be of approximately similar character to that of the Advanced Driver; but it has second and third qualifications in addition —the last of which may not be retained for more than one year without improvement. Also the test must be taken annually and higher classification may not be attempted until after a lapse of a year. Candidates are required to attend a preliminary course of lectures on Maintenance and Roadmanship—unless excused by other suitable qualifications—and must answer questions on maintenance and also details of the Highway Code, as part of the subsequent driving test. An attractive car badge, bearing the tested driver's number, is available to those successful in either examination. These trials are all conducted by police drivers. There is much to be said for belonging to both bodies, since the Safe Drivers' provides an annual check on the Advanced Drivers' standard and reveals any tendency for it to decline.

It is interesting how frequently those who fail these tests condemn them as inculcating what they often describe as a "holier than thou" attitude. But this, even where the jibe may have some justification, and so long as continual self-criticism goes with it, is very practical ethics. A good-natured but pitying contempt for the bad behaviour one continually encounters on the roads is both safe and sound. To become irritated and tempted to reciprocate instead is certainly neither. An almost mannered courtesy (especially if it can be achieved under provocation) and a deliberate effort to drive with style can be extremely effective. Careful recent analysis, taking many ancillary factors into account, reveals unmistakably that a nation's accident statistics are closely correlated with its cultural maturity and humanity, and are a measure of its sense of social responsibility. This largely applies, *mutatis mutandis,* to individuals, too. In sum, it is a "prior duty of the responsible Christian to ensure that his own behaviour as a pedestrian or a driver sets the highest standard" (ibid.). At the same time he may well remember the commandment, "Never mould yourselves any metal gods" (Exod. 34. 17—Moffat), and add, "nor deceive yourself that supernatural powers are bestowed by such"; proceeding continually to our Lord's own petitions, with special application to this particular sphere of our daily action: "Father, . . . forgive us also our errancy, for we forgive anyone who transgresses against us. Do not bring us to ordeal, but save us from evil," on the highway.

John H. L. Waterson.

What do we mean by "the Church"?

THE purpose of this article is to outline a theory of the term "the Church". This example will be used to illustrate some of the difficulties which arise when we strive for a clear understanding of theological language.

Language-mapping is an enterprise of the moment. Most feel that the languages of mathematics and science have indeed been greatly clarified, but that the value of the work so far done on the language of morals is still in doubt. There is little doubt that theological words are now proving most resistant of all to the kind of clarification which the empiricist is trying to perform. There are two good reasons for this: (i) Theological language claims a unique versatility, being both speculative and regulative—descriptive and prescriptive—and also supremely general, and applicable to all particular circumstances: (ii) Recent work has shown clearly that any analysis of a theological term is itself a theological theory. Thus, I am aware that in this paper I am simultaneously proposing an analysis of "the Church" and a doctrine of the Church. The fundamental concepts of theology are not fixed points, but subject to continual reappraisal by successive generations of theologians. Any analysis of one of them must also be the analyst's reappraisal.

And now "the Church". Dr Mascall has said that "the Church" is a highly analogical concept. We thank him for the hint, and apologize for our use of it.

From early times it has been recognized that "the Church" is a many-levelled notion. Here are four examples:

(i) At Pentecost the Church was regarded as a Body-in-process-of-congregation. The Body-hitherto-congregated could be distinguished from The-completed-congregation-of-the-elect, an eschatological entity. Later, the Church came to be regarded as a plurality of local points-of-congregation which would presumably flow together to form the single great congregation of the last time. (For the development of this idea compare Isa. 11. 10–12; Matt. 8. 11; John 11. 52; Acts 2. 1–11 and 39, etc.)

(ii) For various reasons, the distinction was remade in Africa, thus: the visible Church, now thought of as a universal sacramental institution (and necessarily a unity), was distinguished from the invisible Church. For however much theologians wished to maintain the Cyprianic position, extra ecclesiam nulla salus, it had to be conceded that membership of the visible Church did not *guarantee* salvation, for there was apostasy (and further, it had to be admitted that some might be secretly apostate whom persecution never exposed) and non-membership did not *preclude* salvation, for there was also conversion (and further, it had to be admitted that some might be secretly of the faith who never heard the word of preaching, or for some other reason never joined the communion of the Church).

For these reasons the visible Church could not be simply identified with those-of-the-elect-who-are-in-statu-viae. Later reflection on extra-

Christian morals and religion was to introduce technical terms like "uncovenanted mercies", "fides implicita" and so forth.

Suppose that the visible Church's discipline were perfect: all the elect and none but the elect are found and baptized at birth, so that neither conversion nor excommunication are ever needed. In that case the visible Church would have identity of denotation with the Invisible-Church-Here: but it still would not have identity or connotation. For the term "the visible Church" invites us to consider Christians as the world sees them, in their present frail state: whereas the term "the invisible Church" refers to their fore-ordination to glory. It is an eschatological term.

(iii) A distinction was also made, overlapping with the last, in terms of different modes of the Church's existence. The Church's substance is in heaven, where it exists perfectly, in triumph. ("Exists perfectly" means that it is filled with God, "deified", gratia plena.) There are two derivative modes of the Church's life, a state of purgation—a kind of antechamber or vestry—and a state of probation, the Church's growing point. On earth the doors, in purgatory the dressing-room, and in heaven the banqueting hall. This apparently spatial model is used in somewhat uneasy combination with a temporal model in which the Church's *present* lowly condition is contrasted with its *future* glory. The Millenium may appear as a kind of temporal counterpart of purgatory on the spatial model.

(iv) The distinction between the visible and invisible Churches was remade at the Reformation. In this formulation, the visible Church is the local congregation seen as the immediate creation of the Holy Spirit—unmediated, that is, by Apostolic Tradition as vested in the Holy See, the Episcopate, or the Whole-Visible-Society. The notion that the visible Church is a federation of local congregations united both (through the ministry) by sacramental and (through common subjection to a centralized governing authority) by juridical links, is resisted. Instead the local visible congregation is contrasted directly with the invisible Church, regarded as the whole number of the elect, known to God alone: though he is usually believed to communicate a supernatural knowledge of their election to his chosen.

We have, in these four ecclesiologies, a very complex set of notions. I want to make only a few points. First, it seems that any ecclesiology must contain a distinction similar to that between the visible and the invisible Churches. Even the African theorists could not avoid it.

Next, we can distinguish theories which desire to maintain some kind of divinely guaranteed link between the visible and the invisible Churches, from those which do not. In the former class a doctrinal development can be traced, in that authority is successively conceived to reside in the local bishop, the whole number of bishops meeting in council, the chief bishop speaking in council, and the chief bishop speaking ex officio. In the second class of theories there is no such guaranteed link, but it is held that there are certain criteria by which a man *who is himself of faith* (they are not strictly empirical criteria) can discern a local congregation which is a true manifestation of the Holy Spirit's activity—such as the preaching of

the pure Word and the administration of the Gospel sacraments. But there is no certainty in the application of these criteria: the only certainty is that given to the individual in virtue of his possession of saving faith. You cannot be certain about the Church, and nor should you be certain about your own faith (as some enemies of Protestant theology have unkindly supposed it to teach) but only about the *object* of your saving faith.

At any rate, everyone distinguishes the *appearance* of the Church now from its *Heavenly reality,* whether conceived as its *future* state, or as its *eternal* state. The intention is to say that the Church is *more* than, as an empirical organization, it appears to be. It is necessary to invoke this *more* in order to explain why the Church is more than a plurality of congregations with a common religious interest, united by purely legal bonds. The Church is claimed to be *more* than this, it is *one body,* and that the Body of Christ. The *more* is invoked in order to explain that though there are many fonts and altars, many languages, many rites and ceremonies, nevertheless there is only one Baptism and one Eucharist. *The explanations have to be routed via the* more.

That is why we cannot accept the solution of those who would attempt to clear up our difficulties by saying that the word "Church" is logically on a par with words like "army", "university", "species"—i.e. it certainly "exists", but not in such a manner that, when you have pointed to all its members, you can then (by *another* act of pointing *of the same kind*) indicate the thing itself. The word, it is said, indicates an association of individuals having certain specifiable common characteristics, and between whom certain specifiable relations subsist: but it is not something "physically" over and above its members, and it can be abstracted from them only "in the mind", not *in re.* To say that "Church" is logically on a par with "army" is to adopt the viewpoint of an unbelieving historian for whom the Church is simply one among other historical institutions. Ordination is, then, not *more* than a Commissioning Parade; Baptism is not *more* than an act of enrolment; bishops are not *more* than administrative officers; the Church, like a city company, is only metaphorically a "corporation"; and there is only metaphorically "one" Eucharist.

One of the things that belief implies is acceptance of the claim that the Church is *not* merely an empirical institution, but also a theological reality. Hereafter I call the Church, regarded from the empirical standpoint, as a visible institution, CE; and I call the Church, regarded from a theological standpoint (one body, one faith, one Baptism—all that the *more* involves), CT. This is my way of formulating the distinction between the visible and the invisible Churches. We have now to inquire what relation subsists between these two terms, and to try to define them. And that will be our aim in the remainder of this paper.

Archbishop Temple is reported to have declared, "I believe in One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, but sincerely regret that it does not exist". This is puzzling and disturbing. What can it

mean? Is there no Church? Is the Lord's promise void? Has God allowed the Church to lapse from, let us say, 1054 to the date of final success in the Ecumenical movement? If we are still waiting for the actualization of the Church, have orders and sacraments been irregular, if not invalid, all these years?

Again, many an honest Anglican must have puzzled his head over the Branch theory of the Church. How can bishops be the indispensable guardians of true doctrine when genuinely episcopal bodies teach different doctrines? In what sense are Swedes, Copts, Jacobites, Russians, Old Catholics and the rest all "branches" of the one true Church? It does seem queer to say that Anglicans are spiritually closer to Ethiopians (who *are* supposed to be a "branch of the true Church") than to Methodists (who are not).

To return to Temple's dictum. I think we can see that it is so phrased as to lead one to make a category-mistake. The "One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church" in which the Archbishop believes is a theological entity—CT. When he says that it does not exist, he can only mean that he does not see it perfectly and exclusively manifested in any CE body. Rather, the "Corpus Mysticum Christi", CT, the invisible Church, appears to us in the historical order under the forms (to use sacramental terminology) of a plurality of visible Churches, historical institutions which enhistorize it analogically in different ways and in different degrees of perfection.

Unlike Temple, Roman Catholics claim for one such institution (CE) that it *is* a uniquely privileged and authoritative enhistorization of CT. If, as some think, they do in fact identify CT with CE, this particular society, then Protestants may be right in charging them with conceptual idolatry; or, as they usually put it, with so defining "the Church" as to make "the Holy Spirit" redundant. For, in Protestant theology, "the Holy Spirit" stands above all for that divine Agency by which CT is being made manifest in CE, and by which, in the reverse direction, CE is undergoing continuous transformation (through the ministry of word and sacrament) into CT. If CE and CT are already identical, then the Holy Spirit's activity is not required.

However, this is not quite fair to the Roman position. There are two replies. First, suppose it to be the case that the Roman wishes to assert a relation analogous to the hypostatic union between CT and CE; then since, in the case of Christ, the Spirit's activity is asserted as maintaining the union once established by Incarnation, so in this case also, by analogy, the Holy Spirit's activity will still be asserted. But, secondly, this is not the Roman position, for if it were there would apparently be no need of the sanctification of CE; whereas just that is the continual preoccupation of that Church. The use of the term "the Church" in such a book as Fr Leeming's on Sacraments shows that the Roman's eye is firmly focussed upon CT, and that the raison d'être of CE is that it offers the soul sure opportunities (guaranteed, that is, on God's side, but conditional upon faith and repentance upon ours) of incorporation into CT. By sacraments, CT is present in CE, assuming souls. But CT and CE are not merely

identified; it was not Romans, but careless Anglicans, who described the Church as the extension of the Incarnation.

Still, the notion of guarantee is plainly important to Romans, whereas the Protestants refuse to admit any point at which CT may be asserted infallibly to control and manifest itself in CE. Acts of faith, leading to infallible assurance, are not true exceptions, for they are *invisible* both in performance and as to their object. They are not directed at E-realities, like Popes, councils, bishops, sacraments; *nor even* at those objects regarded as the vehicles of T-reality, for they are *not the infallible vehicles* and are therefore not "safe". The only case in which an E-reality, being the infallible vehicle of a T-reality, may be an object of faith is that of the Incarnate Son. The final and general union CT/CE is reserved for the End—and, for the Protestant, no one can have his union before all do, so there are no corporal assumptions. Even Christ waits, as it were, for his brethren before his glory is completed. (But we should deplore another careless phrase, "the Christ that is to be".) The union CT/CE is *in process*, but must not be asserted of any person (such as a saint) or object (as an image, relic or the sacramental species) or institution (as the Church).[1]

We have already said that we are uneasy about the Roman and the Independent positions and prefer to look upon Christian bodies as being all in different ways and in different degrees manifestations of the activity of CT in the historical order. We set out to clarify that claim, first by drawing out three consequences of it.

(1) It is a mistake to attempt to discover the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church by historical research. This famous error was made possible by the equivocity of the old meaning of the English word "primitive", which indicated both the earliest state of a thing and its state of innocence, purity and simplicity. The primitive Church was thought of as the archetypal Church, and therefore as virtually CT. But the CT is not an historical entity which can be discovered in that way with the carnal eye.

(2) Nor can the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church be found by historical prediction, as when a "Coming Great Church" is spoken of as the goal of the Ecumenical movement. It may be that their language shows that this is an eschatological hope on the Ecumenists' part, in which case it is certainly proper, for eschatological entities belong to the T-order of things; but as an historical hope it is a delusion.

(3) It is also a mistake to attempt to discern criteria by which true branches of the Church can be distinguished from false; for that

[1] An important reservation must be made. In careful discussion much Roman theology can seem compatible with Protestantism, where Roman practice is not. Theology allows only "Let us adore Christ present in the Sacrament", or "St Anthony, pray God to help me", etc. But practice says, "Adoremus in aeternum sanctissimum sacramentum" (Antiphon at Benediction), and "St Anthony, help me". Protestants then object that theology, instead of condemning, sophistically justifies bad practice. Here is a case where greater understanding of the others' habits of thought will lessen tension.

attempt supposes that both the branches and the true Church of which they are branches, are CE realities, and therefore represents a hankering after the Roman position (conceived, probably, in a way unacceptable to Romans themselves). If we are thinking solely in E-terms, then one branch is as good as another, for heretic and orthodox alike have received the Christian tradition in virtually the same way from the pre-schismatic ages by traceable historical links. Infallible criteria of genuine branches are open to the objection already raised, that Churches possessing all the criteria differ in doctrine. Who, indeed, supplies the criteria—and, if orthodox faith is made one of the criteria, then who defines the orthodox faith—without falling into circularity?[1] Branch theorists have never indeed successfuly answered Newman's query, What have Anglicans got which, for example, Donatists have not?

There is, then, no list of criteria of the "true Church" as an E-reality. There is no E-institution, or plurality of E-institutions, which occupy a privileged position. Churches are analogues of the Church, and there is, it is well known, no value in listing the points at which an analogy corresponds *exactly* with its prime analogate; for analogies are never exact, in that sense, in any point whatever; if they were, they would not be analogies.

CE bodies, then, I am saying, make up a family of analogues of CT. In natural theology God's creatures are E-analogues of God. God, the prime analogate, sets up the analogy by positing a realm of creatures, secondary analogates, which manifest him in different ways and in different degrees. Then as God to creatures in the natural realm, so CT to CE in the realm of re-creation, "Supernature". CT is the perfectly supernaturalized creature, the first fruits of all creation, Christ's consummate flesh, and the instrument of the general re-creation. Acts of blessing, consecration, sanctification are acts of the Church in the churches, of CT in CE; they are T-acts, and therefore discernible to faith alone, but their effects may be empirically observable (e.g. we may see a convert live better). The analogy then is this: that CT's effects stand to CT in the same kind of relation as that in which God's effects stand to God. The analogy is cross-linked by the fact that the former is the special case of the latter. God's re-creation through CT is not wholly discontinuous with his initial act of creation.

The primary creation of CT in the E-order is the family of CE bodies. The family is large by now, and relations within it are sometimes strained. I believe that we should say, nevertheless, that the total Christian tradition is mediated to us by not less than the entire family (renegades and all); and that no member has exclusive rights. Certainly there is a mainstream of tradition, and clearly too simple "sharing of our riches" (as the Ecumenists call it) may only lead to complete confusion. CT is a proper object of religious aspiration, and it is not attained by "sharing" or federation on the basis of the

[1] As when a Church says, "Because I am guaranteed by my possession of the criteria, I have a title to define them."

lowest common confessional denominator. As a theological entity, CT is never exhaustively manifested in any one CE body, or even in the whole family as it is at any one time, or over any finite period. Its complete manifestation in the E-realm is by definition the Eschaton.

We said at the start that we had two terms, and a relation between them, to define. By CT I understand the Corpus Mysticum Christi. By CE I understand the visible family of institutions by which the Christian tradition is perpetuated in the historical order—a family whose limits one should not wish to define. By the relation I understand something mysterious for which terms like "enhistorization" and "manifestation" might be tentatively employed. It is an analogical relation which may usefully be compared with others—such as those of Creation, Incarnation and sacramental presence, all of which we have adduced.

What, then, is CT itself? It is not a purely regulative conception, in the Kantian sense, though it has a regulative role. Theological entities in general, and eschatological ones in particular, are not merely ideal essences, objects of aspiration, in a metaphysical sense. For God is thought of as agent, of which creatures are effects, and CT as God's instrument, of which holy things and people are effects. But there *is,* undeniably, a sense in which CT is ideal, not yet fully completed—we mean that by calling it an eschatological entity.

The odd feature about eschatological statements is this combination of existential with regulative claim (changing the jargon, of "now" with "not yet"). We noted this when we observed that the contrast between the lowliness (*here* and *now*) and the perfection (*there* and *then*) of the Church was made in both "vertical" and spatial metaphors, and in "horizontal" and temporal ones. It is being asserted of CT both that it is a heavenly actuality, at work, having observable effects now, in this world; and also that it is in some sense incomplete and waits upon our strivings. It has often been said that this problem arises also in the case of "God"—theological naturalism—but whether or not it arises there (and some think that a theonomous ethic is not an heteronomous ethic) it certainly does arise in the case we are considering.

We have arrived at a general problem of the philosophy of religion, and our immediate task is ended.

Don Cupitt.

Revised Reviews: VII — F. J. A. Hort's "The Way, The Truth, The Life"

Hort's Hulsean Lectures were delivered in December 1871, shortly before his return from his country parish to Cambridge as Fellow and Theological Lecturer of Emmanuel College. In the previous February he wrote that he had been "a little thinking about

John xiv. 6 as supplying four subjects".[1] But the work on the Revised Version of the New Testament, added to his continuing labours on the text, had kept him busy: in September he was examining for Trinity Fellowships in Botany and Geology, and in December for the Natural Sciences Tripos. When December began, he had only just finished his second Hulsean. "I must be prepared", he told Westcott, "for not having touched IV when III has to be preached."[2] He must have been correcting Tripos papers and working feverishly at the last two lectures at the same time. The last Hulsean was "preached" on 17 December, the day before the publication of the Natural Sciences class list—and all this under the handicap of a bout of ill-health.

Worn out as he was by the pressure of these weeks' work, he still could find "a satisfaction in that combination of Natural Science Tripos and of Revision with the Hulseans".[3] But for some time he could make no attempt at preparing the lectures for publication. It was not till 1874 that the MS of the first two lectures was prepared for press, and part of an introduction drafted. He never got much further, though Westcott tells us that "as on many former journeys, the sheets and the MSS were taken to Switzerland on his last journey in 1892".[4] Three years before that, he was lamenting his unproductiveness in a pathetic and revealing letter to Sanday of Oxford. "What from earliest manhood I have most cared for, and most longed to have the faculty and the opportunity to speak about, is what one may call fundamental doctrine . . . and especially the relation of the Gospel . . . to all human knowledge and action. Some aspects of the subject were treated in a course of Hulsean Lectures which I delivered nearly 18 years ago. . . .Unluckily the last Lecture was written in a state of dull exhaustion, and so fell disproportionately below its intention, as indeed did also less egregiously its predecessor. But the time has never yet come when there has been a quiet space of at once tolerable vigour and tolerable undistractedness for completing even these unpretending little discourses. . . . Perhaps it would have been less difficult, but for an increasing sense that as things now are they could help little if unaccompanied by a thorough discussion of problems needing a different kind of treatment."[5]

Hort in fact had taken very seriously "the restrictions imposed [upon the Hulsean Lecturer] by fitness for the pulpit". He believed that "it is only in speaking to Christians that a Christian can set forth without distortion the weightiest grounds of faith".[6] The office of apologist was not congenial to him: "Christian truth never appears so vulnerable as after the reading of treatises written expressly in its defence."[7] Still, he thought it possible by giving his lectures the form of an exposition of Scripture to achieve his three-fold object: "the expression of personal conviction, the encouragement of independent belief, and the appeal to the relations between the

[1] *Life and Letters*, p. 144. [2] Ibid., p. 160. [3] Ibid., p. 162.
[4] *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, p. viii. [5] *Life and Letters*, p. 406.
[6] *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, p. xxviii. [7] Ibid., p. xxix.

Christian revelation and the sum of experience."[1] Of these three purposes, the last is the one which was for him "the most essential to the whole plan"; and to illustrate its dominance must be the chief concern of the present review.

No one who has learnt from the *Life and Letters* to admire in Hort a Christian thinker more in advance of his time than either of his two great associates in New Testament study, is likely to escape a certain disappointment in reading *The Way, the Truth, the Life.* The high value of his expository treatment of the Last Discourses in the Fourth Gospel, and their place in New Testament thought, is not indeed diminished by his unquestioning acceptance of the text as a record of the actual words of Christ. But, except in the second Lecture, exposition has too nearly been allowed to crowd out application to the problems of the modern world—problems with which the "Notes and Illustrations", taken from material put together for the lectures and added as an Appendix to the published work, show that Hort was constantly wrestling. It is from the many profound aphorisms preserved in this Appendix that a reviewer to-day is most tempted to quote. I must content myself with one remarkable passage: "Two ultimate positions, not proved but likely to be true. (1) In the past: Man with his whole mental and spiritual nature [has been] derived through various stages from lower beings having no such nature, and these probably in turn from inorganic bodies. (2) In the present: Man's whole mental and spiritual nature is conditioned by his physical nature and its pathological states, no mental or spiritual movement taking place without a concomitant physical movement." To this statement, characteristic of more in the writer than mere refusal to be disturbed by developments of biology and psychology, he adds the note that acceptance of these positions does no more than extend "to the whole range of God's working within our known world that which everyone believes to be true as to a greater or less part of His working".[2]

In the first Lecture the central theme is that the right aim and direction of human life must be discerned "in relation to a universe of greater ways which all meet in one Divine Way".[3] As *the* Way, Christ is "at once the perfect image of human destiny and the perfect image of the Divine Counsel: the Way in man . . . and the Way of God".[4] "To learn by experience the identity of the two ways is to learn the supreme lesson of life."[5] The task now confronting the Church is "to discern and follow the Way, not only as He is manifest in the chosen body which bears His name, but as He abides hidden in the wide outlying universe of human action and knowledge".[6]

The Way requires to be followed: the Truth requires to be known. Hort begins his second Lecture by claiming for the Christian Gospel that "it was an altogether new thing to learn that the knowledge of truth is indispensable for the mature service of God".[7] He was well

[1] *The Way, the Truth, the Life,* p. xxx. [2] Ibid., pp. 187 f.
[3] Ibid., p. 17. [4] Ibid., p. 23. [5] Ibid., p. 17. [6] Ibid., p. 34.
[7] Ibid., p. 43.

aware that the *word* "truth" has in the Johannine writings a theological significance which does not attach to its comparatively infrequent use in the rest of the New Testament. But he rightly insists, not only that the "wisdom of God in a mystery"—that mystery which is Christ "in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden"—was for St Paul the goal of all Christian apprehension, but that the method and purpose of Christ's own teaching in the Synoptic Gospels is to initiate his hearers into the knowledge of "the mystery of the Kingdom of God". So in the Fourth Gospel, if the truth that makes men free is Christ himself, then "His nature must be so inwardly at one with the nature of man and of every world in which man can move, that in the knowledge of Him must be folded up the knowledge of all things".[1] The sphere of the truth to be known must be as wide as the sphere of possible free action.

But in the working out of a Christian theology, the Church came inevitably to take the knowledge of God as not only the beginning but the end of ascertainable truth. Since the Renaissance, the pursuit and attainment of truth in many departments of knowledge has been accompanied by an increasing relaxation of dependence on theology. Hort was sure that the benefits of the modern situation were greater than its dangers for faith. Theology, which had previously lacked independent standards of truth, has now to recognize both that there is no absolute distinction between truth of discovery and truth of revelation, and that "theological truth is not divided from other truth by the inscrutable nature of its subject matter. If the revealed knowledge of God receives its form from the limits and peculiarities of human faculty, yet no kind of human knowledge is exempt from the same condition."[2] The fact that the idea of truth has been so largely shaped by our new knowledge of the lower world of nature should not lead us "to judge of ourselves and all that is above us by measures and procedures taken exclusively from things below us".[3] Yet "the Gospel itself can never be fully known till nature as well as man is fully known".[4] Hort had no illusions about the seriousness of the coming tensions between science and traditional Christianity. But the scientist in him could look forward with confidence to their resolution—a confidence securely grounded in his conviction that "truth is never that which we choose to believe, but always that which we are under a necessity to believe".[5]

The third, unrevised Lecture is a comprehensive exposition of the biblical conception of Life, and of the "salvation" brought by Christ as restorer and preserver of life on all its levels—the life which is both the pre-condition and the fulfilment of knowledge of the truth and truth-directed ways of action. And here again we are not to look for the life which Christ gives, and is, "in isolation from the lower life which we share with all living things, and the varied relationships by which we are united to our fellow-men. It is the glory of His life to include every life."[6]

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[1] *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, p. 53. [2] Ibid., p. 75.
[3] Ibid., p. 82. [4] Ibid., p. 83. [5] Ibid., p. 93. [6] Ibid., p. 146.

The last Lecture as printed is an incomplete fragment. But there is enough of it to show the lines on which Hort would interpret the saying "No man cometh unto the Father but by me". Its apparent exclusiveness is "an assurance that the keys of all worlds with which we have to do are in the hands of Him who took our nature and died for our sake".[1] And we cannot come to the Father by an effort "to cleave to God and dispense with the world".[2] "The wider and fuller our communion with His works, the closer and healthier will be our communion with Him."[3]

We can well understand that by 1889 Hort should have come to feel that what was then required was "a thorough discussion of problems needing a different kind of treatment" from that which he had attempted in his Hulseans. Yet it was assuredly a prophet who had delivered himself in the pulpit of the University Church, only a few years after the *Origin of Species* had made so many fear for the things that were coming upon the earth.

J. Burnaby.

Letter from South India

The Church of South India has always liked to claim that it is a church on the move. On the one hand, changes in personalities alter situations probably more radically than in the West; on the other hand, it is in some ways easier to tackle problems without great delay. This makes it hard to write a letter that is not out of date before publication.

Episcopacy has more and more come to root itself in the consciousness of all our people: when the Lutherans asked us that in discussion with them we should be ready to discuss the necessity of episcopacy, we replied that union as we understood it implied that each church should bring its true riches with it into the larger body, and that, since we considered episcopacy as a precious part of our heritage, we could not consent to call it in question. Again, the episcopal bench is now a much more national one: there are only three foreign diocesans left. This has some interesting corollaries. The "foundation bishops" included some notable theologians, who had forged a particular C.S.I. approach to theological, especially union, problems in the long period of negotiations before 1947. They had a great unity of outlook and the C.S.I. was in their blood. Moreover, because of their connexions with other countries and their furloughs overseas, they had a wide outlook, and were often in personal touch with the latest developments in theological thinking in the West. The newer Indian bishops who have succeeded them have fewer such natural advantages. We have more pastors but fewer professional theologians on the bench. Most of the new bishops have seen the greater part of their service inside the C.S.I., knowing it as an accepted fact, without having shared in the costly negotiations that preceded it.

[1] *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, p. 159.
[2] Ibid., p. 162.
[3] Ibid., p. 164.

And the pressure of local affairs, combined with the lack of a tradition of a regular holiday away from the diocese, could lead to a concentration on pastoral problems to the exclusion of theological thinking at the wider, ecumenical level. In this context, invitations to our bishops to visit other countries assume a new significance as a way of keeping open the channels of fellowship and theological exchange. It will be good if when abroad they are not thought of merely as deputation preachers, but are admitted to the church's councils at the highest levels. If, moreover, as we hope, we enter before long into negotiations for union with the Lutheran Churches, then our newer bishops will know something of the experience of their predecessors, and will again be called on to prove and apply the C.S.I. approach with a very theology-conscious body.

In three recent diocesan appointments, the diocesan councils did not succeed in electing the necessary panel of names to be sent for final selection to the Moderator's committee, and the elections being thus invalid, it fell to the Moderator himself to appoint the new bishops. It was known that for a long time the Moderator had been eager to bring in men from outside the various dioceses, where considerations of language and other factors made it practical (the rules of election allow the Executive Committee of the Synod to nominate two such men in every election for presentation to the diocesan councils when they are electing the panel, but only once in C.S.I. history has an outsider ever been elected by vote of a diocesan council). In each of these three cases, the Moderator took advantage of the invalid elections to bring in unexpected men from outside, in each case the choice was met with a volume of criticism from inside the diocese, but in each case, within a very short time, the choices were seen to have been excellent and the new bishops accepted and loved. Anglicans in England, fretting for a more truly elective system of episcopal appointment, may take note and chuckle.

It was never thought in the first days that anything like common worship would develop very early in the C.S.I., but now the talk is of publishing the first C.S.I. Prayer Book within a year or so, and the Liturgy Committee is working hard to complete the necessary preparations. The Liturgy and the Ordinal are now in use in their revised forms, and the revision of the Baptism and Confirmation services is nearly complete. Marriage, Burial and Covenant services and a number of forms of Morning and Evening Prayer are still at the earlier stage of optional and experimental use, and a number of suggestions for their revision have already come in. At present, it looks as if we may have a number of alternative forms of service for public worship when the Liturgy is not used, something in the manner of the Book of Common Order. Recent meetings of the Liturgy Committee have been concentrating on the revision of the Sunday Propers—Collects, Old Testament Readings, Gradual Psalms, Epistles, Gospels and Proper Prefaces—and encouraged by many friends both here and overseas, the committee has been making a number of departures from the original scheme, and besides ransacking ancient sources, some bolder spirits have been trying

their hands at the difficult art of writing new collects. Daily Bible Readings are already in use, and a list of "Memorable Names" has been drawn up which may perhaps become the basis of a C.S.I. Calendar, though it cannot be said that at present there is any great agreement about who should be in the Calendar, whether it should be accepted, or how it should be used if it is. Drafting a short form of the Liturgy for use with the sick is proving no easy matter, and this suggests that the Liturgy as it stands is a well-loved unity. All this work requires a great deal of correspondence and collation of results and attempting to decide between equally attractive alternatives; the committee itself is a pleasant combination of experts and amateurs and so brings together both respect for tradition and freshness of approach.

The long-drawn-out theological conversations with the Lutherans ended in 1959, and in view of the agreement reached there, the theological commissions recommended that the churches might appoint committees to draw up a constitution for a united church. The C.S.I. accepted this proposal at the Synod of 1960, but the Lutheran Churches, which work through a Federation, are of course much slower and the proposal is still with the various churches. We understand that some are ready to open negotiations at once, but it seems good to wait until we hear from the Federation itself.

One of the most frightening things about life in the C.S.I. at present is that in spite of the deepening measure of real unity we experience, caste disputes are continually arising, and some people have been bold enough to say that now caste is stronger in the Christian Church than among Hindus themselves. Caste frequently comes to the fore when coveted appointments are to be made. In many places it is still not possible to appoint a pastor of a "lower" community to a congregation of a "higher" one, and it is still rare for Christians of one caste to invite those of another caste to their wedding feasts. Briefly, it cannot yet be said that all Christians in the C.S.I. have come to regard their fellowship in Christ as a deeper loyalty than their obligation to their own community. There are notable exceptions such as North Malabar where caste has more or less disappeared, but in many places even disputes that do not begin as caste affairs are before long given a communal twist.

The initial period of the C.S.I.'s life, the period of launching out in the limelight of controversy, is probably now over, and we settle down to the normal problems of growing as a church. Apart from caste, the problems are those that face most churches, the need to raise the standard and status of the ministry, the development of a maturer spiritual life, the development of lay witness in all walks of life where Christians live side by side in natural contact with non-Christians, the growth of a deeper theological thinking. There are no easy ways forward, but the fresh flow of life released by the union gives us hope that these issues will be boldly tackled. And the more fellowship we receive from other churches elsewhere, the greater is the hope of some achievement.

GEOFFREY PAUL.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

A TASK FOR THEOLOGIANS

DEAR SIR,

If Mr Wiles is right when he says in the course of his stimulating article in your May issue that the doctrine of God and other central doctrines of Christianity are frequently dismissed in reports of ecumenical discussions "as something about which no difference of opinion has been noted", he is certainly doing a valuable service in drawing attention to this fact. There must be at least a suspicion that such verbal agreement merely disguises radical differences of thought, and even if this is not so, there is plenty of criticism of traditional doctrinal statements by philosophers and others, both Christian and sceptic, which merits very serious consideration.

The difficulty with all theological expression, based as it is on more or less inadequate analogy, seems to be that of deciding what can legitimately be called its first principles. Every theologian must presumably work from some philosophical position, and each has to decide to what extent his first principles are empirical, metaphysical, existential, or based on a direct revelation which carries its own authority. The strength of this is that an infinite variety of ways of trying to express the inexpressible is likely to say more than just one or two. Its weakness, however, is that it is possible to build whole systems which are more or less mutually exclusive.

There certainly would appear to be little common ground for discussion, for example, between a Barthian and a Neo-Thomist, each in his small corner. But if a group of scholars of widely differing views, and into whose souls the odium theologicum had not entered too deeply, were put together with the intention that they should produce a common report on, say, the doctrine of God, there would emerge at least a clarification of their differences, leading perhaps later to more positive formulations. The very fact that in such a meeting differences of opinion would cut across confessional allegiance, would help to prevent the kind of historico-emotional prejudices which wrecked the recent conversations between the Church of England and the Church of Scotland. And if the participants were men whose Christian charity and receptivity of mind equalled their intellectual stature, there might be a fruitful cross-fertilization of ideas.

It is arguable, of course, that this sort of thing is not what ecumeni-

cal discussion is for. Also, who would convene such a meeting, and what authority would its report have? But perhaps a layman may be forgiven his impatience in thinking that this is all a more urgent matter than the precise nature of episcopacy or the sacraments. And is he wrong in thinking that a prior discussion of first principles and the central doctrines of Christianity would illuminate these secondary problems which divide Christians?

MAIDWELL HALL,
NORTHAMPTON.

Yours faithfully,
GERALD RANDALL.

CHRISTIANS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

DEAR SIR,

The authors of the article on "Christians and Nuclear Disarmament" say that the very certainty of mutual suicide makes it less likely that nuclear war will break out. This is the best argument that can be made for keeping the bomb. But time is short; soon many smaller countries whose statesmen are even less responsible than those in Washington, Moscow and London, will have the bomb too. Sir Charles Snow has said that it is certain that some of these bombs will go off within ten years. In any case, the bomb produces such hysteria and hatred that the arms race will never be halted by negotiation. We must start by trusting the Russians since they are men like ourselves, and stop threatening to wipe out millions of people in revenge for our own destruction. (Let us admit that the West would not use the bomb first, though this proposition is explicitly denied by N.A.T.O. and by the British government: see the 1957 White Paper on Defence.)

The authors also state that we should have no more importance in Washington than the Republic of Ireland if we became neutral. But little Ireland is to-day doing far more for world peace in the U.N. and the Congo than Great Britain. If in Laos we have been of any use it is because we are not attached to either side in the dispute. Russia and America can never be reconciled by an ally of America, always committed in the last resort to support her.

When you put your 2s. 6d. in the Christian Aid Week envelope, have you really done your duty towards the two-thirds of your brothers who are starving? We are paying £1,650 million per annum on preparations to kill. In a starving world this is the moral equivalent of dumping food in the sea. If a Christian is "deeply concerned that nuclear war should never happen", is it not paradoxical that he should advocate the retention of the only means by which it can happen? Do figs grow on thistles? Does peace come from armaments?

On a point of detail, the article says that *The Era of Atomic Power*, the report sponsored by the British Council of Churches, was published in 1948, whereas in fact it was published in May 1946.

KING'S COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.
31 *May* 1961.

Yours, etc.,
PETER BAIRD.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHRIST OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL. By E. M. Sidebottom. S.P.C.K. 1961. 27s. 6d.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL. By G. H. C. MacGregor and A. Q. Morton. Oliver and Boyd. 1961. 15s.

From the very first paragraph it is clear that Mr Sidebottom is a scholar who can write: and write with a complete command of some complex material. His book will be necessary reading for specialists in Johannine studies, and though the argument is for the most part of too technical a nature for those unversed in Mandaism or the Nag-Hammadi literature, the conclusions are important for all students of the gospels. Sidebottom's aim is to understand John by means of a close examination of the key terms (Logos, Son of Man, Son of God) in the light of similar language in other literature of the same time. He follows those who would connect John more with Jewish than with Hellenistic influences—though with a Judaism that has not been impervious to Greek ideas. There is more affinity btween John and Philo than between John and the Dead Sea Scrolls; but John's Christian faith fills the terminology with a content which it does not possess elsewhere. Philo could have said that the Word belongs to the same sphere of being as God: John, who was no metaphysician, and was not under the spell of gnosticism, though he was aware of the Christological problems that were to exercise the minds of the Church later on, simply says that the Word was God. The Logos is for the first time personal and no longer merely personified. Similarly, in his use of the synoptists' term Son of Man, John was not, as Bultmann supposes, indebted to the Anthropos myth of the Near East (so that John actually reproduces Jesus' teaching more faithfully than his predecessors, who had distorted it by bringing the Son of Man into line with Judaism). Rather, any influence there was on John can be confined to the Wisdom literature of Judaism.

The last two chapters of this notable book show the author as Christian philosopher of history, and they might be regarded as an extended comment on Hoskyns' Introduction. "The dictum, 'We must not ask whether John's record is true, but what it means', was after all a confession of failure." John "plainly believes that Jesus is knowable, and the study of his pages disabuses the mind of the tendency to find transcendental doctrine divorced from the flesh of Jesus". Not surprisingly, then, the fourth gospel helps us to understand the other three: "*They* give the past as it exists in reminiscence . . . he overwrites the tradition with comments incorporated into the text." A remarkably fine book; but it can't be read at the bus stop.

Mr A. Q. Morton is a Church of Scotland chaplain to the R.A.F. with a flair for statistics which he has brought to bear on the question of the composition of the fourth gospel; and which has, at least to a large extent, won the approval of Prof. G. H. C. MacGregor, the

author of the Moffatt New Testament Commentary on Acts which proposed a theory of textual dislocation somewhat similar to what Mr Morton independently, by a novel technique, holds to be fairly certain. The authors believe that the well-known (apparent) breaks in the sense sequence in John can be explained on the hypothesis that the gospel was composed in two stages. First, there was a version of nearly two-thirds the length of the present gospel; it was later enlarged with insertions from a second source, which can be distinguished by a minute analysis of the length of paragraphs and lines and of vocabulary. The conflation was done by a redactor whose motive was to adjust the gospel, especially in incidents where Peter is mentioned, to the synoptic tradition. Assuming that the redactor was copying his sources into a book, and not on to a roll, he was working to a limitation of space and was obliged to work out with some care the proportion which could be allowed to each source. First, it may be supposed, he copied out the Prologue and the early scenes of the shorter gospel, up to 3. 21; he then turned over to the secondary source for 4. 1–42. By this time he was able to estimate how much of each source he could use for the rest of his book; and so he proceeds, balancing the progress of his book with the consumption of the sources.

Many will recoil from this kind of criticism and feel that recent English scholarship has decisively disproved any theory of dislocation or lack of continuity in the thought of the gospel. Nevertheless, Mr Morton has provided a curiously fascinating body of new criteria which ought not to be brushed impatiently aside. And one of the rewards for persevering with this book is the incidental gossip picked up on the way—such as the surprising fact that eleven words, used in the gospel 4,800 times in all, make up no less than 30 per cent of the total text.

Wilfrid Browning.

Blackburn.

On the Eternal in Man. By Max Scheler. S.C.M. Press. 1960. 63s.

This is a collection of papers on topics related to philosophy and theology. The greater part of the book is taken up with a long work, "Problems of Religion". In addition to this, and to explanatory notes on Scheler's thought, the work includes one other fairly long essay, "The Nature of Philosophy and the Moral Preconditions of Philosophical Knowledge", a shorter essay, "Repentance and Rebirth", and two addresses, "Christian Love and the Twentieth Century" and "The Reconstruction of European Culture". Most of the writings date from the years 1917–21. An informative note by I. M. Bochenski tells us that many of the views expressed in this work, where Scheler appears as "a personalist, a theist and a convinced Christian", were repudiated later when he lost his faith. In another note we learn that Scheler regarded "the paths of Christian theism in its Catholic form . . . as part of a genuine development in his

thought and as a necessary transition to the metaphysical views of his later years", views which remained only outlined at his death in 1928.

In many ways the best thing in the book is the first essay, "Repentance and Rebirth"; it is also the clearest. Here Scheler sensitively describes the phenomenon of repentance, and shows how various theories then current (viz. that it is a kind of self-torture, or a sort of "moral hangover", or a kind of pointless regret grounded in fear) either are incomplete or misdescribe the case. Repentance has moral and metaphysical "depth"; it is a movement which "brings before our minds of its own accord the mysterious outline of an infinite and eternal Judge, an eternal and infinite mercy, an infinite might, an eternal source of life".

"On the Nature of Philosophy" and the first sections of "Problems of Religion" are closely linked. Here Scheler considers what philosophy is, and how it is related to religion. I do not find his answers clear, nor do I think the confusion all mine. He objects, in some excellent pages, to views which merge philosophy and religion either partially, like e.g. Thomism, or completely, like Gnosticism or Hegelianism. The goals of philosophy and of religious experience, he seems to say, are identical, in the one case "direct union" between "the whole man's 'Act-centre' and Reality", in the other a direct "transposition" achieved through this experience, of the personal self into the godhead, whence it "seeks to understand the meaning of the world". The metaphysical endeavour, however, has its own distinct route. "Religious experience can discover attributes (of the ens a se) which will always be hidden to metaphysics, but metaphysics can also discover attributes which religion could never discover by its own procedures". Most of "Problems of Religion" is concerned with Natural Theology as explication of the insights of Natural Religion, i.e. as the "essential phenomenology" of Religion.

Scheler seems to think that there is a natural revelation of God grounded in the immediate contact of the soul with God, and fulfilled in positive revelation. Natural Revelation makes us *think* of God as a person, of the soul as immortal, of the world as "fallen" and of an infallible organ of revelation. Positive Revelation provides these concepts with objects; and this is faith. Natural Theology cannot demonstrate the reality of God; however, only a real God could be the ground of man's religious propensity, and since religious acts cannot be explained away, God's reality is certain.

The two addresses seem to me to have only historical interest, though they show the width of Scheler's concerns. The book as a whole contains much that is imaginative and rewarding; it is also prolix, unsystematic and crammed with dubious terminology. Scheler's definition of religious experience (vide supra) seems to me such as to lead to atheism; for if there is *no* religious experience there is no God, and if there *is* religious experience God is superfluous.

Lionel R. Wickham.

Boston.

Humanism and Moral Theory. By R. Osborn. Allen and Unwin. 1959. 18s.

Human Freedom and Social Order. By John Wild. Duke University Press: C.U.P. 1959. 37s. 6d.

Humanism and Moral Theory is an attempt to look for an interpretation of ethics in humanist terms—that is, an interpretation "which does not go beyond the bounds of human life for its criteria of good and bad, right and wrong . . ." (p. 9). The book begins with an account of how moral understanding develops in children, based on the work of Piaget. Gradually they come to distinguish the self from the not self, and with this change comes the replacement of egocentricity by sociality, in the normal child. This growth is like a miniature of the historical development of morality. As society evolves, and specialization makes men increasingly inter-dependent, the sphere of human concern broadens from the self to the family, the tribe, the nation and so on.

This leads, Mr Osborn claims, to an objective understanding of good and evil. Ethical terms relate to this development from self-centredness to sociality, and "to those objective conditions of social life in which men's humanity can express itself" (p. 81). This thesis is worked out in a readable style with many illustrations. As an account of how ethics evolved, in psychological terms, the Christian reader will, I believe, be much helped. But in at least two ways he is likely to hold reservations. First, when Mr Osborn discusses religion, he seems to assume that this can be assessed almost entirely by its ethical role. But how far can Christian ethics be understood without their context of the vision of God? Secondly, what exactly is included in "the bounds of human life"—which provide our criteria? This phrase conceals a multitude of difficulties. If it means the totality of human experience—in all our relationships—then can a humanist ethic leave out of account man's search for God?

In *Human Freedom and Social Order* the reader finds himself in a different world, although many of the same problems are treated. An awkward style is the worst feature of this book, which together with its enormous range makes it a difficult one to grasp fully. Throughout it is an attempt to explore the possibility of a Christian Philosophy—in which there are all the empirical checks of scientific thinking, but where, whenever ultimate decisions are involved, there is a "Christian guiding image".

In Western thinking there has been a transition from myth to reason; from an interpretation of life in which primitive man is one with the object of his experience to a rationalism that questions, and that seeks to be detached from its object. But the result of this "gnostic enterprise", as Prof. Wild describes it, has been, in part, a failure. The mythical life of the primitive gave a "global grasp", while it lacked many things—whereas the rational life brought "personality, freedom and historicity" but failed to illuminate the "depths of subjectivity".

The Christian Faith differs both from myth and rationalism. It is

"founded on historical events" (p. 54), but makes free use of myth in its own manner. This is worked out in an interpretation of basic Christian doctrine in which the author's existentialist approach is clear. For example: "It is only by an immediate grasp of our personal existence as we live it in the family that we may gain some distant sense of the source of our being."

There follows an account of the relationship of faith to reason, and then an exploration of how a Christian Philosophy, as it is here understood, can be applied to society—to give a Christian Ethic that recognizes the need for universal moral law, but which fully sees the needs of the "person".

Despite its obscurities the book is challenging. There is an honest attempt to relate Christian ideals to politics and the stuff of everyday life; and a welcome openness to searching criticism. The Christian Philosopher, in dealing with evidence, "will follow it wherever it may lead, no matter how damaging this may be to what he thinks is the faith" (p. 92). There is great need to combine this approach with the subtleties of human experience—to many of which the former of these two books is blind.

M. J. Langford.

Queens' College,
Cambridge.

Protestant Thought and Natural Science. By John Dillenberger. Doubleday. 1960. $4.50.

This is not just one of the many books on science and theology which attempt to marry them with indecent haste while assuring us that all is perfectly respectable. In fact, it is really a plea to postpone the wedding until we are quite sure what we are doing. The first and much the longest part of the book is an historical analysis which might have been called The Rise and Fall of Protestant Natural Theology. Dillenberger is well read in the history of German Protestantism, and he brings out sympathetically what the Protestant scholastics were trying to do in their defence of orthodoxy. The struggle, as he sees it, was essentially about the autonomy of revelation, i.e. whether science or Scripture was to be normative in the interpretation of the Christian faith. Unfortunately the issue was obscured by a fatal confusion between scriptural knowledge and scientific knowledge. As long as this confusion persisted and Scripture was regarded as a body of knowledge on the same level as science, the theologians found themselves being driven into a more and more impossible position. The confusion was made worse by the fact that the scientists, with the best possible intentions, contributed to the development of a natural theology based on science; and this, ironically enough, brought about the very transformation of theology against which the orthodox were protesting. Not until the time of Schleiermacher was there a real attempt to "bring the Newtonian world and the religious dimension together without obscuring or mixing them". Furthermore, it is only in this century that there has

been possible a sophisticated restatement of the Christian faith in its own terms rather than in the terms dictated to it by science.

In the second part of the book Dillenberger looks briefly at some modern trends in theology and science (among the theologians Barth and Tillich) and shows how the main emphasis has been on keeping the two disciplines well apart. The most serious deficiency in this section is his failure to see linguistic analysis in its true proportions as the philosophical heir of science; in fact, he dismisses it in a footnote. This enables him to sidestep its immensely important challenge to metaphysics, and to appear far too complacent about the collapse of natural theology. But these criticisms relate only to the last few pages of the book; its excellent historical section alone makes it well worth reading.

J. S. Habgood.

Westcott House,
Cambridge.

Revolution and Papacy, 1769–1846. By E. E. Y. Hales. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1960. 30s.

This is an admirable piece of history. Mr Hales writes a clear, frequently a vivid and compelling prose, without sacrificing historical accuracy to dramatization. He proves himself an urbane guide through the intricate events of these years, and balances his narrative with illuminating discussion of some of the more controversial aspects of the period.

The opening episode, Clement XIV's suppression of the Jesuits at the behest of the Bourbons, reflects that close interconnexion of politics and religion which is to be the theme of the book. Next, the Hapsburgs tried to gain administrative control over the Church; then the French Revolution attempted first to run it, later to destroy it. Mr Hales shows that, originally, these revolutionary offensives were the more dangerous in that their aim was to improve the Church, to bring it up to date according to enlightened principles. The reaction of Rome in the face of this danger was only too typical of the Holy See—"just that caution, that delay, that hope of conciliation, and that final intransigence which have generally characterized her behaviour when confronted by a major challenge to her traditional rights" (p. 87). The long struggle of Pius VII and Napoleon is central here. Mr Hales describes particularly well the nadir of Papal hopes in 1811, and the indignities suffered by Pius at the Emperor's hands after that dramatic coronation in Notre Dame, whose true significance he points out lies in the first flickering that it brought of a new ultramontane sentiment.

In the latter part of the book, Mr Hales deals with the restoration of the temporal power of the Papacy. He recognizes that this was inevitable in the context of the time, since contemporaries believed that the Pope must be maintained on a footing of equality with other European sovereigns. "It was supposed that if he were not kept on that footing those sovereigns would cease to take him seriously,

and would therefore cease to take seriously the claims of the Catholic Church in their own territories" (p. 257). But he also shows that such a policy was to have disastrous consequences not only in the government of the Papal states themselves, but in the persistent anti-liberal attitude which the Popes pursued throughout the rest of Europe. For if they were committed in principle as well as by tradition to the Papal states and to their theocratic government, they were also committed to supporting absolute monarchy elsewhere. It is not the least of Mr Hales's virtues that he is not apologetic about the manifest shortcomings of the Papacy, and yet realizes sympathetically the difficulties that face men forced to combine temporal and spiritual considerations.

Esther de Waal.

Cambridge.

Christians of the Copperbelt. By J. V. Taylor and D. Lehmann. S.C.M. Press. 1961. 30s. and 16s.

A combination of the trained observer from outside and the resident missionary and social worker has produced a brilliant survey of the growing Church on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia.

African Christians in Northern Rhodesia leave their village homes to seek work on the Copperbelt. They quickly find themselves men of two worlds—the world of the chief, tribal elders, home church and home wife, and the world of the non-tribal proletariat with its emerging political leaders, its suspicion of the intentions of all Europeans including missionaries, its beerhalls and its pick-up girls. At first they seek out "their" church, but partly at least because they find there their fellow-tribesmen. (The authors do not point out that similarly dubious motives inspire a lot of church-going among Europeans in Northern Rhodesia!) But many lapse when they get caught up in the atmosphere of racial conflict.

Can Europeans and Africans live together in one church organization? The authors pile up the difficulties in the way of this. There is the emergence of the self-conscious African personality, with its myth that "Livingstone came to make Africans soft" (no worse, in my opinion, than the former myth that made him the totem of the European tribes in Northern Rhodesia, the epitome of their virtues); there are differences in church discipline, in standards of living, in language and in customs; there is a difference in the very apprehension of God, and the African, who is beginning to see God as "ecstasy, terror and beauty" but not as logos, is not at home in the staid and slightly nostalgic worship of the expatriates.

The case for separate church organizations for the two races, such as the Dutch Reformed Church insists on, is, therefore, strong. Yet the authors conclude that the theological and sociological objections to this are decisive, and that God's challenge to us in Central Africa is to make visible in our day the radical unity that already exists among those who are baptized into Christ.

There are one or two small errors concerning Anglicans. The most

serious is on p. 51; nine, not two, Africans have been ordained to the priesthood since 1941, though four of these were ordained since 1958, when the survey on which this book is based was made.

J. KINGSNORTH, O.G.S.

CHIPILI,
N. RHODESIA.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE SCOTS CONFESSION OF 1560. St Andrew Press. 1960. 10s. 6d.

THE KIRK IN SCOTLAND. By James Bulloch. St Andrew Press. 1960. 25s.

PRESBYTERIAN AUTHORITY AND DISCIPLINE. By John Kennedy. St Andrew Press. 1960. 15s.

FAITH COMES ALIVE. By Ian M. Fraser. St Andrew Press. 1960. 4s. 6d.

The late Dr G. D. Henderson, whose classic essay is now prefixed to a new edition of the Scots Confession of 1560, pointed out that the latter document was tacitly accepted as a standard of the Church under both the Episcopalian and Presbyterian régimes in the 17th century. Although opening on an aggressive note—"Lang have we thristed, dear Brethren, to have notified to the Warld the Sum of that Doctrine quhilk we professe, and for the quhilk we have susteined Infamie and Danger"—it is a surprisingly moderate statement of belief, avoiding the violence of the 1581 Negative Confession and the scholastic Calvinism of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms. It crystallized the passionate belief of the Reformers that Scripture is the absolute and only standard of faith and order, but Scripture is to be interpreted in accordance with "the rule of charitie". Those who have been puzzled or irritated by the recent festivities in the Kirk could profitably ponder the Confession, preferably in the original Scots version and not in the rather superfluous and in places inaccurate "translation" which has been appended to this edition.

In *The Kirk in Scotland* Dr Bulloch considers the relevance of the Scots Confession for the present day. He insists that the Reformers were not ashamed to call themselves "Catholic", and did not (as is sometimes supposed) see themselves as the heirs of the medieval heretics. In the Reformed Church he locates the seat of authority in Christ speaking through his Word, and exposes, to his own satisfaction at least, the absurdities which result from a dual belief in an infallible Church and infallible Bible. Dr Bulloch's best chapters are on the moulding of national life by the Kirk. "We who also live in an age of revolution look back to see how God dealt with our fathers and to learn something of His will for us in our time." It is sad that Dr Bulloch does not provide more explicit references for his numerous and often disconcerting quotations. Burns and Aquinas are self-explanatory, but some of the others re-

quire a gloss. An index would have made his book an even more useful permanent possession.

Dr Kennedy's Chalmers Lectures deal with the same basic theme. Following the Confession he reaffirms that the authority by which the Church must be judged in all ages is neither private opinion nor hierarchic succession, but Scripture. Moreover, among the Confession's three "notes of the true Kirk" is "ecclesiastical discipline uprightly ministered". Dr Kennedy pleads for a renewal of the original emphasis of the Reformed Churches on "the sense of a collective responsibility for the moral conduct of their members, with, as a consequence, the duty of obedience to constituted Church authority properly administered". If some of his practical suggestions seem hackneyed, this merely shows that it is high time they were taken seriously.

In *Faith comes Alive,* Dr Fraser provides topics for Group Study, using material from the Scots Confession and John Craig's catechisms. In the "Living Issues" with which each section concludes, he highlights the differences between his own Church and Rome. He does not claim to have written a polemical tract; his tone is infinitely more restrained than that of the Reformers, he finds much common ground with his Roman Catholic brethren, and is admirably self-critical. Nevertheless, he tends (like Dr Bulloch and Dr Kennedy) to over-simplify the points at issue, and sometimes contrives to tilt at windmills. It is to be hoped that the Groups which use his book will not take too seriously his statements about what other people believe.

Ian Clark.

Edinburgh.

Prayer in Progress. By J. H. Churchill. Hodder and Stoughton. 1961. 10s. 6d.

The Well-springs of Prayer. By Georges Lefebvre. Translated by Kathleen Pond. Geoffrey Chapman. 1960. 8s. 6d.

The English Mystical Tradition. By David Knowles. Burns and Oates. 1961. 25s.

The first two titles under review provide an interesting contrast and really demand each other. The first tells us much of the mechanics of prayer, the second, what it is like to pray; the first succeeds splendidly in gearing prayer to life, the second, to God. The one tends to be diffuse, the other monotonous; the second tells us how to pray once we have begun, the first, how to begin; the first is youthful, the other mature like old French wine. But again, both are necessary to the student and serious layman, to whom the first is especially addressed. Dom Lefebvre knows many secrets, and his pure wisdom provides the necessary corrective to the tense introspection induced by Mr Churchill's slightly larger book, which nevertheless has many good things to say, both directly and obliquely, and anchors the

doctrine and practice of prayer firmly in the wider doctrines of the Church, the Spirit and the sacraments.

In criticism of it, I cannot believe that meditation is the only or best beginning to a life of prayer: there is no mention of contemplative reading. The author must in future deny himself the use of archaisms and the word "just". Chapter IX has been largely spoilt by the repeated use of "effective" for "affective", and misprints are noted on pp. 64, l. 3; 114, l. 2; and 149, l. 8.

The English Mystical Tradition provides a searching analysis of the central teachings of the five great spiritual writers of the 14th century, assessing their intrinsic value and place in the whole mystical tradition of Christendom. The book closes with an illuminating chapter on Fr Baker and his achievement in rehabilitating the greatest English mystics among the English congregation at Cambrai.

This is a sober, incisive book, with every word weighed, and it is likely to conclude a number of controversies. It splendidly exemplifies that "patient loyalty to fact and keen sense of reality" which Edward Talbot so revered in Dean Church and made him his master; and it is wholly one with Church in "preferring an awkward expression that was accurate before a polished one that was not". Inevitably, under such scrutiny estimates and perspectives are profoundly altered, and we now look with new eyes on Rolle, Margery Kempe, and Fr Baker. Yet even its severest criticisms echo Church's conviction that "justice needs to be done to whatever human achievements have shewn reality and life". It will become a definitive work in its limited field.

The book might possibly be improved by the relegation of the difficult first chapter to the realm of *Afterthoughts*, as in *Western Mysticism*. There is a misprint on p. 113, l. 15, and 1529 on p. 162 should read 1629.

J. K. Byrom.

Cheadle Hulme.

Eusebius in Caesarea. By D. S. Wallace-Hadrill. Mowbrays. 1960. 35s.

Eusebius was a man of many parts. Best known to posterity as historian and biblical scholar, he was also prominent as ecclesiastical leader and theologian at one of the most eventful periods in the whole history of the Church. Dr Wallace-Hadrill's book is a well-balanced account of the man and of his many-sided activity. It is soundly based on a thorough study of the writings of Eusebius, while showing at the same time a good knowledge of recent scholarship. In all it is a valuable and reliable account of one who, though often called the Father of Church History, has not always received very sympathetic treatment at the hands of his descendants in the family of Church historians.

Maurice Wiles.

Clare College,
Cambridge.

Talks on the Gita. By Vinoba Bhave. Allen and Unwin. 1960. 16s.

The Integral Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. Edited by H. Chaudhuri and F. Spiegelberg. Allen and Unwin. 1960. 42s.

Muslim Devotions: A Study of Prayer-manuals in Common Use. By Constance E. Padwick. S.P.C.K. 1961. 35s.

A Dialogue of Religions. By Ninian Smart. S.C.M. Press. 1960. 18s.

Islam in India and Pakistan. By Murray T. Titus. Christian Literature Society. Revised reprint 1959. Rs 3.75.

The first two of these five books are further instances of the tremendous output of literature on Hinduism designed to appeal to the Western reader. These two particular works are, however, unlikely to prove epoch-making influences. The number of commentaries on the *Bhagavadgita,* the most popular of the "non-canonical" Hindu classics, is legion; and this one by Vinoba, while it contains many thought-provoking comments, is no improvement on some of the better-known commentaries. The second volume consists of a symposium by Eastern and Western contributors on the philosophy of the well-known Hindu savant Sri Aurobindo. Some of the papers have appeared before. One wonders whether publishers really do sell out their printing of such books as this at so high a price. Sri Aurobindo's message is described as "of the outflowering of the Divine in collective humanity". Again, the introductory essay informs us that "the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo may aptly be described as integral nondualism, or integral idealism, or just integralism". The non-specialist interested in Indian thought should supplement his reading of this kind of book with a more down-to-earth survey of Hinduism such as Koestler's *The Lotus and the Robot,* in order to get a more balanced picture of Hinduism as a practical creed.

Miss Padwick's extensive anthology of popular Muslim manuals of devotion may well be of interest to the Western student of contemporary Islam; but it is difficult to see how it can be of value to anyone else. Muslims themselves are unlikely to read it. A further defect is that, apart from some remarks in the introduction, there is no attempt to discuss the Muslim theology of prayer. There is much that is edifying in this book, as there is in most sincere treatises on prayer; but one is puzzled why a book of this sort should have been published by S.P.C.K.

Mr Ninian Smart's *A Dialogue of Religions* is a most welcome discussion on the fundamental ideas of the great living systems: as the author rightly remarks, "philosophers of religion (that is, all men who think about religion) cannot ignore the comparative study of religions". The dialogue is between a Christian, a Jew, a Muslim, a Hindu, a Hinayanist Buddhist and a Mahayanist Buddhist. Needless to say, no striking solution of the problems of difference between the religions is arrived at; but, as he follows the discussion, the reader should gain a clearer and more sympathetic understanding of the

intellectual bases of the several faiths. It must be borne in mind, however, that the dialogue is almost entirely on religious propositions, and has little to say about religion as activity, either moral, liturgical or mystical.

Islam in India and Pakistan is a more factual survey. It is a further volume in the paper-back "Christian Students' Library", published for the Senate of Serampore College, who have had the general reader as well as the theological student in mind in producing this series. Dr Titus's book first appeared in 1930 under the title *Islam in India*: it is now brought up to date and is a highly competent book, full of interesting facts and figures, as well as having a useful historical outline, bibliography and glossary of Islamic terms as appendices.

D. W. Gundry.

University College,
Ibadan.

The Bible in the Age of Science. By Alan Richardson. S.C.M. Press. 1961. 12s. 6d. and 5s.

The Meaning of Sacred Scripture. By Louis Bouyer. Darton, Longman and Todd. 1960. 35s.

The Word of God and Fundamentalism. Report of the Oxford Conference of Evangelical Churchmen. Church Book Room Press. 1961. 4s.

Unless some Man show Me. By Alexander Jones. Sheed and Ward. Stagbook edition. 1961. 6s.

Scriptura Sola: Wyclif and his Critics. By Michael Hurley, S.J. University Press, Fordham, N.Y. 1960. N.p.

Prof. Richardson's book, which has a somewhat misleading title, is a first-rate study of the history of Christian doctrine since the scientific revolution. Theological teachers and students, ministers and teachers of religious instruction will be immensely grateful for this valuable tool for their study (and that, in addition to its intrinsic importance, it is available for only five shillings). The early part contains a masterly sketch of the scientific, historical and theological revolutions, with a presentation of the theological development between Schleiermacher and Barth. In the second half, Prof. Richardson expounds Existentialism, Heilsgeschichte, the theology of images, and gives his own presentation of biblical theology. He has a very helpful way of presenting material for the reader's judgment, not hiding his own judgment, and yet stimulating to further reflection. The reviewer has been stirred to think how much we need a full-scale assessment of Barth's doctrine of the authority of the Bible; clarification of what we mean by history (Prof. Richardson contrasts T. A. Roberts's *History and Christian Apologetic* with James M. Robinson's *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus* as exemplifying the difference between the 19th century understanding of historical method and that of the 20th century. This is a valuable provocative thesis but hardly satisfying); and clarification of the rela-

tion between biblical theology and systematic theology. The book is to be most warmly commended.

With Prof. Richardson's final chapter may be compared the larger-scale but less systematic treatment of the Bible by Fr Bouyer. Whereas Prof. Richardson concentrates on history, Fr Bouyer emphasizes the harmony of ideas. His book is interesting rather than magistral, but his treatment of wisdom and mysticism is valuable. The British thinker to whom his thought is closest is W. J. Phythian-Adams. In the Old Testament the need for a new theological assessment of Ezekiel is not recognized, and the omission of the first three gospels from sustained treatment is very odd.

The blurb to Prof. Richardson's book says: "A theological revolution, based on a return to the Bible has accompanied, and has creatively responded to, the massive scientific revolution itself. Unfortunately it is too little appreciated by the general public." But why should the general public appreciate this, when there are powerful Christian voices who deny this theological revolution in the name of biblical inerrancy? One group of these are Evangelical Churchmen, who, in their latest Conference Report, hold to the identity of the words of Scripture with the words of God. Here they are at one with Roman Catholic teaching in Fr Alexander Jones's popular expositions. The principle at stake has been stated quite clearly by Fr Gabriel Hebert: "The ideal biblical student would have to be as sharply and even daringly critical as is humanly possible, and at the same time deeply sensitive to the things of the spirit, and so far as his will goes entirely obedient to God's will." As long as this double emphasis on criticism and obedience is not universally accepted among Christians, the general public will be hindered in its appreciation of the theological response to the scientific revolution.

Fr Hurley brings out fairly enough how one-sided and difficult a person Wyclif was. *Scriptura Sola* is not a balanced view of the truth, and Wyclif's contemporary critics have much truth on their side. But the most Fr Hurley can say in accounting for the rise and influence of Wyclif is: "In the heat of argument even orthodoxy has over-stated or over-simplified its case." He does not seem to realize that the word *even* in this context is glaringly un-biblical.

H. Cunliffe-Jones.

Manchester.

Tertullian's Treatise on the Resurrection. The text edited, with an Introduction, Translation and Commentary, by Ernest Evans. S.P.C.K. 1960. 50s.

Dr Evans has put us all in his debt for making available to us in this way a work which asserts the resurrection of the dead so clearly and uncompromisingly, in contrast to pagan notions of reincarnation, or of the flesh as inherently evil with salvation as the soul's escape from it. Tertullian agrees that man consists of soul and flesh, the former giving life to the latter and separated from it at death. Nevertheless, both are God's creation, and since the flesh works for

the soul as a servant, not as a tool, both must be brought together to stand trial at the Last Judgment and take their punishment or reward as a single and complete human being. Tertullian insists that our resurrection will be like Christ's, with the same physical continuity, except that now we have merely a partial gift of Christ's spirit which guarantees the full gift later on.

In his Introduction Dr Evans describes the Marcionite, gnostic, and pagan ideas of the destiny of the body which Tertullian was concerned to refute, and shows how his doctrine and his defence of it were based on a continuous Christian tradition. The rest of the information is given piecemeal in notes on the text. With the very detailed textual and lexical notes this is to be expected, but it does make it difficult to assess certain points in Tertullian's doctrine as a whole (e.g. the influence on it of Stoic materialism, despite Dr Evans's obvious acquaintance with the sources). And the scattered references to Montanism may leave the reader guessing how near Tertullian was to that movement when he wrote this treatise.

Translating Tertullian is no easy task, and if Dr Evans's translation is at times a little stilted (e.g. "a similitude concerning vacuity", etc., on p. 83) it does convey something of Tertullian's argumentative forcefulness. But, more important, it conveys Tertullian's sure feel for the meaning of Scripture at a time when the nature of Christian orthodoxy was far from obvious. The severity with which Dr Evans can take him to task when his exegesis is fanciful (e.g. in chapter 26) is no little tribute to its general soundness.

C. J. Sansbury.

Portsmouth.

Disorders of the Emotional and Spiritual Life. By W. L. Northridge. Epworth Press. 1960. 16s.

Love or Constraint. By Marc Oraison. Burns and Oates. 1960. 25s.

Here are two books which in entirely different ways seek to bring to bear the insights of psychology upon religious upbringing in particular and pastoral ministration in general. I use the phrase "religious upbringing" deliberately, although Dr Oraison's sub-title is "Some psychological aspects of religious education". Both writers, however, show the overwhelmingly preponderant influence of the home relationships: the educator can either build on or in a small way counteract these—but these are fundamental.

Dr Northridge writes in the tradition of Dr Leslie Weatherhead, to whom his book is dedicated. In fact, this book at a slightly less profound level might be a sequel to Weatherhead's *Psychology and the Service of the Soul*. It is based on sermon-lectures delivered at missions; the writer is cautious of the emotional conversion sometimes aimed at in evangelistic missions. He is concerned with the emotional needs and disturbances rather than the intellectual difficulties of would-be Christians. There are fourteen chapters on our more common spiritual maladies and causes of frustration and dis-

tress: none of us can read this book without seeing himself to some degree mirrored in it somewhere. It is very agreeably written: it is full of sound sense, a wisdom that is the fruit of maturity in a pastoral ministry. There are good quotations from other writers on this theme and some useful exergeses of texts. The illustrative material (which is good) is nearly all drawn from the preacher's experiences in the U.S.A., where different conditions do as a matter of fact give rise to rather different psychoses from here. I know "human nature is the same the whole world over": but this book would have been even more valuable to us if the case-histories had less frequently been trans-Atlantic.

Dr Oraison's book is more general. It sets out as a study of psychological features of growth from birth and their effect on the religious consciousness. While there are some good and stimulating ideas, it is true to type as an instance of the Gallican style of thinking and writing, and it is not very pleasingly translated. An endeavour is made, "though of necessity in a somewhat arbitrary and theoretical way" (p. 64), to give an account of contemporary psychology, but it is rather sketchy and elementary, reaching the obvious conclusion that "religious education is not by any means a question of teaching solely, but of a proper psychological atmosphere" (p. 85).

There are some wise and well-balanced words on the achievement of happiness during adolescence. On sex education the writer is evasive about the right treatment, merely condemning the wrong. It is a pleasant surprise to find a Roman Catholic so stressing the importance of Scripture teaching, and especially in the Old Testament the Prophetic Books.

RONALD LUNT.

BIRMINGHAM.

SERMONS FOR THE PARISH COMMUNION. By Norman Campbell. Mowbray. 1960. 6s. 6d.

This paper-back of 50 sermons (13 seasonal, 7 topical, and the rest general) might, as the author says, be used for other occasions than the title suggests. The general level is high and the construction made easy to follow, since each is on the same plan of introduction, three points and conclusion. Use is made of wide reading, illustrations from everyday affairs, and there is some humour. The sermons can be recommended for use by the clergy, though they should be adapted for local conditions.

IAN R. CARRICK, O.G.S.

IRENE,
TRANSVAAL.

BOOK NOTES

An article in the April number of *The Hibbert Journal* by Karl Barth should not be missed in which he considers what lines of development are viable to-day for liberal theology. A volume of his sermons preached in Basel prison, entitled *Deliverance to Captives*, has been published by the S.C.M. Press (12s. 6d.). A new volume of Warrack Lectures on Preaching has come from the St Andrew

Press, *With Ardour and Accuracy* by R. Leonard Small (12s. 6d.). An exceedingly useful guide to the *Nineteenth-Century Pamphlets at Pusey House* has been prepared by Father Hugh, S.S.F. (Faith Press, 15s.); cp. his article on "Pamphlets at Pusey House" in THEOLOGY, April 1958, pp. 149–52. *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell*, edited by R. E. Egner and L. E. Denonn (Allen and Unwin, 42s.), is a 736-pp. anthology of his writings on the large range of subjects on which he has expressed himself during the course of his life. *Cranmer's Selected Writings*, edited by Carl S. Meyer, is a commendable addition to the S.P.C.K. Seraph Books (6s.). A second series of W. K. Lowther Clarke's *Teaching Sermons* (S.P.C.K., 7s. 6d.) will be welcome to many readers of THEOLOGY: this series contains fifty-two sermons on Old Testament subjects. Sheed and Ward have published in their Canterbury Books *The Catholic and his Church* by Henri de Lubac, S.J. (3s. 6d.). *Saint-Cyran et le Jansénisme* by Jean Orcibal (Éditions du Seuil, n.p.) is a brief introduction with a wealth of illustrations. *A History of Modern France 1799–1945* by Alred Cobban is a new Pelican Book (5s.). Émile Poulat has edited *Alred Loisy, sa vie, son œuvre* by Albert Houtin and Félix Sartiaux (Éditions du Centre de la Recherche Scientifique, n.p.): he has added to it a bibliography of Loisy's writings and biographical notes on a large number of persons that were connected with the modernist movement. There is a long article on "Le Renouveau du Diaconat: situation présente de la controverse" in the April issue of *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*. The January–March issue of *Lumière et Vie* contains a series of articles on the subject of Confirmation. *What is Man?* by Stephen Neill (World Christian Books, 2s. 6d.) is a beautifully clear and balanced exposition of Christian doctrine. *Le Mystère de la Charité* by J. M. Perrin, O.P. (Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges, 210 FB), is a doctrinal treatise of over 500 pp. based on scriptural and traditional sources. The O.U.P. has published the following Church of South India services: *An Order for Holy Baptism* (1s.), *Confirmation* (1s.), *The Marriage Service* (1s.), and *The Burial Service* (1s. 3d.). In *Is Religion a Racket?* (Faith Press, 6s.) K. N. Ross answers over a hundred questions concerning Christian faith and morals. *The New People of the King* by H. F. Mathews (Epworth Press, 2 vols, 7s. 6d.) is the fifth in a series of books which provide a Bible Course for secondary schools: one volume is for the teacher, the other for the class. *The Church in Council* by E. I. Watkin (Darton, Longman and Todd, 18s. 6d. and 6s.) is a historical survey of twenty General Councils, which will serve as useful background information for the coming Roman Council. *Charles Williams, Selected Writings*, edited by Anne Ridler (Oxford University Press, 8s. 6d.), contains representative examples of his writings in prose and verse. *No Hands but Yours* by Dewi Morgan (S.P.G., 1s. 6d.) is the S.P.G. review of the year's work for 1960–61. *The Nature and Purpose of the Canon Law* is a Hale Memorial Sermon, delivered at Seabury-Western Seminary, Evanston, by the Bishop of Exeter (Church Information Office, 2s.). *Personal Christianity* by E. H. Robertson (National Book League, C.U.P., 3s. 6d.) is a guide to books. In *Fact, Fiction, and Faith* J. A. Martin, Jr, offers answers to difficulties that are felt by intelligent inquirers (Oxford University Press, 27s. 6d.). *The Minister's Devotions* by C. R. Walker (St Andrew Press, 20s.) is an introduction to the spiritual life for Presbyterian and other ministers. *L'Unité visible des chrétiens et la tradition* by Max Thurian (Presses de Taizé, 3 NF) deals with visible unity, tradition and prayer for unity.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: Richard K. Ullmann, *Tolerance and the Intolerable* (8s. 6d.).

BARRIE AND ROCKLIFF: Erwin Doernberg, *Henry VIII and Luther* (21s.).

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: D. M. Mackinnon, *The Borderlands of Theology* (3s. 6d.).

GEOFFREY CHAPMAN: Jacques and Raïssa Maritain, *Liturgy and Contemplation* (10s. 6d.); Jacques Leclercq, *Christians in the World* (12s. 6d.).
CLARENDON PRESS: James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (37s. 6d.).
JAMES CLARKE AND CO.: John Calvin, *Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God* (17s. 6d.).
DARTON, LONGMAN AND TODD: Edward Sillem, *Ways of Thinking about God* (18s. 6d. and 11s. 6d.); Dom Hugh Farmer (Ed.), *The Monk of Farne* (25s.); Basil Minchin, *Outward and Visible* (21s.).
DESCLÉE DE BROUWER (BELGIUM): Charles Journet, *Le Mal* (195 FB).
EDINBURGH HOUSE PRESS: Göte Hedenquist, *The Church and the Jews* (3s. 6d.).
EPWORTH PRESS: Erastus Evans, *Pastoral Care in a Changing World* (8s. 6d.).
FABER AND FABER: Geoffrey Parrinder, *Worship in the World's Religions* (21s.); John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation* (30s.).
FAITH PRESS: Rowan Greer, *Theodore of Mopsuestia* (21s.).
GOLLANCZ: Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* (42s.).
HARVILL PRESS: Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Martin Buber and Christianity* (15s.).
HEINEMANN: William Barrett, *Irrational Man* (21s.).
HODDER AND STOUGHTON: R. K. Young and A. L. Meiburg, *Spiritual Therapy* (15s.).
INTER-VARSITY FELLOWSHIP: A. F. Walls (Ed.), *A Guide to Christian Reading* (6s. 6d.).
LONDON BIBLE COLLEGE: John C. J. Waite, *The Activity of the Holy Spirit within the Old Testament Period* (1s. 6d.).
LUTTERWORTH PRESS: Max Thurian, *The Eucharistic Memorial* [Eng. trans. of Part II of *L'Eucharistie*, reviewed in THEOLOGY, February 1960, pp. 74 f.] (12s. 6d.); William Barclay, *The Making of the Bible* (5s.); John Paterson, *The Wisdom of Israel* (5s.); George Knight, *Prophets of Israel* (1) *Isaiah* (5s.).
MACMILLAN: H. Hemmer, *Fernand Portal, 1855–1926*, trans. by A. T. Macmillan [a review article on the French original by Geoffrey Curtis, C.R., appeared in THEOLOGY, January 1950, pp. 23–6] (25s.); Vincent Taylor, *The Text of the New Testament* (15s.).
P. R. MACMILLAN: Said Ramadan, *Islamic Law* (18s.).
NISBET: S. H. Hooke, *Alpha and Omega* (21s.).
OLIVER AND BOYD: Markus Barth, *Was Christ's Death a Sacrifice?* (7s. 6d.); Christian Tindall, *Contributions to the Statistical Study of the Codex Sinaiticus* (21s.); Roy A. Stewart, *Rabbinic Theology* (21s.).
PETER OWEN: Altman K. Swihart, *Luther and the Lutheran Church* (50s.).
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (O.U.P.): Roland Mushat Frye, *God, Man, and Satan* (30s.).
ST JOHN'S PUBLISHING CO. (85 RECTORY GROVE, S.W.4): Paula Columb, *A Crown of Life: a memoir of Bishop Surtees and poems* (n.p.).
S.C.M. PRESS: C. E. Raven, *St Paul and the Gospel of Jesus* (5s.); John T. McNeill (Ed.), *Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion* [2 vols] (6 gns); A. M. Ramsey, *Introducing the Christian Faith* (3s. 6d.).
SHEED AND WARD: Wingfield Hope, *Each his own Tyrant* (8s. 6d.).
S.P.C.K.: R. J. H. Shutt, *Studies in Josephus* (22s. 6d.); Trevor Ling, *The Significance of Satan* (12s. 6d.); James Kallas, *The Significance of the Synoptic Miracles* (12s. 6d.); T. F. Glasson, *Greek Influence in Jewish Eschatology* (9s. 6d.).
S.P.C.K. AND SEABURY PRESS: Owen C. Thomas, *William Temple's Philosophy of Religion* (22s. 6d.).
S.P.C.K. (for the CHURCH HISTORICAL SOCIETY): R. L. Storey, *Thomas Langley and the Bishopric of Durham, 1406–1437* (50s.).
THAMES AND HUDSON: E. O. James, *Seasonal Feasts and Festivals* (35s.).
VAN NOSTRAND (PRINCETON, N.J.): O. Hobart Mowrer, *The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion* (15s.).

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